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Abstract—The numbers and diversity of malware variants 
grows exponentially over the years, and there is a need to 
improve the efficiency of analysing large number of malware 
samples efficiently. To address this problem, we propose a 
framework for the automatic analysis of a given malware’s 
dynamic properties using clustering technique. The framework 
also provides outlier discovery, abnormal behaviour analysis 
and discrimination of malware variants. We also created a 
module for normalisation of malware labelling based on the 
labels we get from VirusTotal, which provides consistency of 
malware labels for accurate analysis of malware family and 
types. An evaluation model for the proposed framework is also 
discussed. Ultimately, the proposed framework will ensure 
rapid analysis of malware samples and lead to better protection 
for various parties against malicious malware. 
 
Index Terms—Anomaly Detection; Automated Dynamic 




Malicious software, which is also popularly known as 
malware, is one of the major cybersecurity threats today. In 
fact, many cybersecurity incidents are usually caused by 
malware [1]. It comes in various forms, such as viruses, 
Trojans, worms, botnets, and rootkits, to name a few. Recent 
report from AV-Test reveals that it registers over 390,000 
samples daily [2]. Due to the exponentially growing numbers 
of malware over the years, a problem that is faced by analysts 
is large scale malware analysis. The high number of malware 
samples posed difficulty for analysis as analysts need to 
extract meaningful information from the samples. To add to 
this problem, the complexity of modern malware employing 
evasion techniques such as polymorphism, code obfuscation 
and metamorphism makes analysis harder. These techniques 
are effective against static analysis of malware binaries [3]. 
In contrast, dynamic analysis of malware binaries does not 
have this limitation for the most part, as these evasion 
techniques are hard to conceal during run-time. Due to this, 
there are many researches which focused on dynamic analysis 
[5-8]. 
While dynamic analysis is a good approach for analysing 
malware samples, it does not scale as it is a time-consuming 
process. It also does not alleviate the problem of exponential 
malware sample analysis. Therefore, the ability to efficiently 
and automatically analyse malware behaviour is needed. This 
is not a new concept as it has been studied and applied before, 
either by clustering or by classification, usually by applying 
different algorithms of clustering or classification, and by 
applying different behaviour representations. The goal of 
clustering is to discover patterns of similar behaviour and to 
discover novel malware classes and variants [9-11]. 
Meanwhile, the goal of classification enables unknown 
malware variants to be added to existing classes of behaviours 
[12, 13].   
In this paper, we proposed clustering of malware behaviour 
using hierarchical and density based algorithm (HDBSCAN) 
to cluster malware samples, and discover unknown variants 
of malware in an efficient manner. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
 
Machine learning is employed to automate analysis as it 
can analyse large number of samples efficiently for the 
discovery of novel malware, reduce analysis efforts and 
provide insights into patterns and trends. There are basically 
two main approaches to machine learning for malware 
analysis, classification, and clustering. It can be done based 
on static analysis or dynamic analysis. Based on previous 
research [10], it has been shown that machine learning based 
on dynamic analysis gives better results than machine 
learning analysis based on static analysis, due to the 
limitations of static analysis.  
Since our work focuses on the clustering of malware 
behaviour for unknown malware, to aid the discovery of 
unique samples, reduce manual analysis time, and to discover 
patterns of malware behaviour, we focus on these line of 
research works. Various methods have been proposed for this 
purpose with varying level of success. In [10], the authors 
modelled malware behaviour as a non-transient state changes. 
Although their technique achieves good results by abstracting 
higher level calls, the system fails to recognize the 
relationship between state changes, and thus does not paint a 
complete picture of malware behaviour, as compared to fine-
grained analysis. In [28], the authors use dynamic analysis 
and machine learning to estimate malware functions, which 
is useful in identifying the characteristics and behaviour 
family of malware. The methods and results of this research 
looks promising. 
Bayer et al. [11] proposed a fine-grained malware 
behaviour analysis. Their framework utilised local sensitivity 
hashing (LSH) on features extracted, to reduce the number of 
comparisons during clustering. However, the variable length 
feature representation makes their approach less scalable. 
Rieck et al. [23] on the other hand, uses prototype-based 
clustering to approximate malware behaviour, which reduces 
the run-time complexity. However, the n-gram approach that 
the framework uses is susceptible to behaviour obfuscation. 
In [29], the authors used hybrid deep learning approach to 
model malware call sequences for classification by 
combining recurrent neural networks with convolutional 
neural networks. Using these techniques, the algorithm gets a 
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hierarchical feature extraction architecture that combines 
convolution of n-grams with full sequential modelling. The 
results are good but we argue that it is impractical to run due 
by many analysts due to the powerful hardware requirements 
needed. 
Labelling of malware samples and clustering of samples 
based on behaviour are explored in [9]. The authors argued 
that anti-malware labels by AV vendors are inconsistent, 
based on the discrepancy clustering results they achieved 
using self-organizing map (SOM), and the majority vote of 
labels from antimalware vendors. 
 
III. CHALLENGES IN ANALYSIS OF MALWARE BEHAVIOUR 
 
Dynamic malware analysis systems can be evaluated based 
on three main factors, which are efficiency, quality and 
stealthiness. Malware behaviour analysis is a type of dynamic 
analysis technique which overcomes the limitations of static 
analysis.  However, it does come with its own set of 
downsides and challenges. As a start, it is time consuming 
and resource intensive, thus the efficiency is low, when 
compared to static analysis methods. This is an unavoidable 
situation, but the advantages it brings outweigh the 
disadvantages, as it is able to disclose the natural behaviour 
of malware. In certain cases, malware samples might perform 
differently when the sample detects that it is being executed 
in a virtual environment, and may show artificial behaviour 
instead of its real behaviour [24].  
This is a problem of stealthiness which needs to be taken 
care of seriously. For any data analysis work, data is the most 
important resource, as the quality of the data determines the 
output of the data analysis. Fortunately, there are 
countermeasures which remedies this up to a certain extent, 
such as the techniques used in [8]. To ensure that the analysis 
environment is safe, we use pafish [25] to check and plug 
vulnerabilities that might interfere with the analysis from 
producing good results. With this, the analysis in the sandbox 
environment can be done by reducing, if not eliminating, the 
triggering the false or undesired behaviours of malware 
samples.  
There is also an issue of analysis quality, and whether the 
analysis is coarse-grained or fine-grained. Coarse-grained 
analysis is usually faster but it gives less valuable data and 
the opposite is true for fine-grained analysis. This is always a 
constant issue in malware analysis. Faster methods should be 
researched which can bring a balance between these two 
approaches. Besides that, the choice of dynamic analysis 
methods such as bare-metal based or virtual machine based 
also influences the quality and results. 
A malware sample may also contain more than one 
behaviour branch, but most dynamic analysis tools only 
observe a single execution path. This might lead to the 
analysis not showing the sample’s true behaviour, which may 
only be triggered under specific condition. There have been 
work done to mitigate this problem [5].  
 
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR AN AUTOMATED ANALYSIS OF 
MALWARE BEHAVIOUR 
 
The main objective of this research is to design and develop 
a framework which is capable of automated and fast analysis 
of malware behaviour. The resulting framework should 
provide the following features to the end users: 
 
A. Fully automated 
Malware samples will be automatically analysed in a 
malware sandbox which is run in a distributed virtual 
machine environment. The resulting behaviour logs will be 
processed to be used for further analysis using machine 
learning algorithm. The results from the analysis will then be 
provided to the analysts, all without analysts doing the 
manual analysis on the large number of samples. 
 
B. Minimal false positive 
False positive is always an issue with malware detection 
due to the nature of malware. Some malware variants mimic 
benign software behaviour thus avoiding detection. By 
understanding and exploiting the behaviour of malware 
samples, this can be minimised. Using machine learning 
algorithms to perform clustering, analysing abnormal 
behaviours and anomalies, analysts can further inspect 
analysis data so that false positives can be reduced. 
 
C. Efficient, fast, and timely 
A malware analysis framework should not take a long time 
to perform analysis, because it can impede response time on 
addressing malware threats. Thus, efficient method must be 
explored and implemented for fast analysis time without 
sacrificing quality and accuracy of analysis.  
 
V. FRAMEWORK FOR AUTOMATIC ANALYSIS OF MALWARE 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
Behaviour of malware can vary from being simple, or it 
can be very complex by having diverse behaviour. However, 
more often than not, malware variants of the same family will 
share common behavioural patterns.  Based on this trait, it is 
possible to exploit this and perform automatic analysis to 
cluster malware of similar behaviour together. It is also 
possible to analyse samples and identify anomalies and 
abnormal behaviour which does not fit into any shared 
patterns learned.  
A diagram of the malware behaviour analysis framework is 
shown in Figure 1. The general steps are summarised as the 
following. 
1. The framework will execute and monitor malware 
binaries in a sandbox environment. Based on the 
behaviour in terms of actions and operations, a report 
is generated for each binary. 
2. Important information in the reports are then extracted, 
and features will be selected, in terms of spatial and 
temporal information of behaviours. Spatial 
information includes the operation and the arguments 
of API calls, dynamic imports, mutex, processes, 
filesystem operations, network operations and registry 
operations while temporal information is the sequence 
of the actions. The features are then embedded in a 
vector space. 
3. Clustering technique is then applied to the embedded 
reports which are in vector space, to cluster similar 
behaviours together, and identify novel malware 
samples. 
4. Report is then generated in file format and 
visualisation format to help in analysis. 
In the following sections, we discuss the individual steps 
and technical background in detail by explaining how we plan 
to develop and execute this framework. 
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A. Malware Behaviour Monitoring 
A framework for runtime behaviour-based analysis is 
required for efficient monitoring of malware behaviour. 
There exist many tools towards this end, which monitors 
malware behaviours by intercepting the system calls and 
logging the execution sequences into log files [6][7]. This 
contrasts with static based analysis, in which malware 
binaries are disassembled or debugged. For this research, we 
choose Cuckoo Sandbox [8]. It is an open source malware 
sandbox which is widely used and provides good controlled 
analysis environment for executing malware binaries. The 
environment is setup behind a firewall to control inbound and 
outbound traffic, and using VPN to mask the original IP 




Figure 1: Framework Overview 
 
B. Data set 
For testing this framework, we gather our malware samples 
from three sources: Virus Share [18], Das Malwerk [19], 
Contagio Dump [20] and Malheur data set [22]. Malheur data 
set will be used as reference data set. The other data set that 
are gathered will be used as application data set. These 
sources are selected for the application data set to provide 
diverse file types and malware types for our analysis, besides 
giving us the large number of volume of malware samples 
collected from various point in time. For the application data 
set, we have collection of 69,000 unidentified malware 
binaries. 
 
C. Labelling of malware 
Unsupervised learning usually works with unlabelled data. 
In the case of malware clustering, there is a need to label the 
data for us to identify malware correctly. However, labelling 
across Anti-malware systems is not consistent. Due to that, 
there have been several researches regarding this. [10, 14, 
16].  Inspired by these previous works, we have designed a 
labelling algorithm which reflects the malware more 
accurately by using CARO naming convention [15] as 
guideline. This algorithm normalises the prediction of 
malware labelling provided by VirusTotal [17] by using 





D. Feature Selection from Behavioural Report 
Reports from Cuckoo Sandbox behaviour analysis contain 
crucial information for analysis. It gives high level 
information of malware behaviour usually in JSON 
representation. From our study, we have identified that File 
system, Windows registry, Process, and Network are critical 
OS resources, as it represents the chokepoint in a Windows 
OS. Regardless of whether it is a clean file or a malicious file, 
every program utilises these resources. We focus on these 
selected categories of information for this framework. 
To fully exploit the information in a behaviour reports  
based on the resources that we have selected, we look at both 
spatial and temporal aspect of information. For spatial 
information, the operation and the arguments of API calls, 
dynamic imports, mutex, processes, filesystem operations, 
network operations and registry operations will be extracted. 
For temporal information, sequence of the actions is also 
taken into account, as it will generally tell how samples 
behave. Feature selection is important because it will help 
keep the dimensionality lower by selecting only relevant 
information and helps improve clustering performance and 
results.  
Based on the features that were selected, format abstraction 
is applied. Each API call is map to the value of the call to 
show the relationship between the operations and its values. 
The sequence of the operations and its values will also be 
mapped. Information abstraction is needed as JSON format is 
not an appropriate format for machine learning, therefore 
requiring a more suitable representation. Moreover, the 
complexity of the extracted textual information from JSON 
reports is high and it will impact the run-time of the 
algorithm. 
 
E. Feature Embedding 
Once the features and its values are selected and abstracted 
from the reports, the conversion into suitable format for use 
in vector space model is done. Then, the sequence 
characterisation of the instructions is performed. It is done by 
considering the contiguous subsequence of fix-length tokens. 
The result of this is referred to as w-shingling, an overlapping 
word-based n-gram. The short behavioural sequence patterns 
is designed in such a way that it will implicitly capture the 
program semantic. 
The report can then be embedded into a vector space. After 
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vector space is performed to remove implicit bias using the 
technique presented in [4]. 
 
F. Comparing Embedded Malware Behaviour 
The goal of this framework is to cluster malware with 
similar behaviour together and give them meaningful label. 
There are several methods that can be used to group samples 
together. One way is to measure the similarities between 
reports, and apply the metric to clustering. The distance 
metric that is chosen to be used is the Jaccard distance, which 
is a simple yet powerful technique. The equation of Jaccard 
distance is; 
 
𝐽𝑑(𝐴, 𝐵) = 1 − 𝐽𝑠(𝐴, 𝐵) =  




where s is the similarity which is bounded on the interval of 
[0,1]. 
 
G. Clustering of Malware Behaviour using HDBSCAN 
Clustering is a basic machine learning technique to group 
data set into meaningful groups of data, whereby objects 
which are similar are in the same group while objects which 
are dissimilar are in different groups. Clustering can be done 
using the various kinds of clustering algorithms, where 
different algorithms will vary in its methods to determine the 
clusters, for example, by calculating the distance or statistical 
distributions of the cluster members. Generally, clustering 
algorithms can be grouped into two groups, which is 
partitional-based clustering or hierarchical-based clustering 
[26].  
Partitional-based clustering algorithm clusters the data by 
decomposing the data into a set of disjoint clusters. It 
produces clusters by emphasizing the local structure or the 
global structure of the by optimising the criterion function. It 
typically involves minimising the dissimilarity of data within 
clusters and maximising the dissimilarity of different clusters. 
Hierarchical-based clustering algorithm, on the other hand, 
are usually either agglomerative or divisive. Agglomerative 
approach starts with each pattern in a singleton, and 
iteratively merging clusters until conditions are satisfied. 
Divisive approach starts with a single large cluster and 
iteratively splitting the data into smaller clusters until 
conditions are satisfied. While the approach taken to achieve 
the results are different, they both have similar characteristic. 
Both produces a dendrogram, a tree-like clustering structure, 
which shows the nested grouping of patterns, and the 
similarity levels of the pattern grouping at which grouping 
level changes.  
There have been many techniques and approaches using 
clustering techniques to classify unknown samples into 
known malware families, or into unknown malware family, 
based on the behaviour of malware samples [9-12, 23]. When 
clustering is applied to malware behavioural report for 
malware analysis, it allows the learning of malware data 
structures and the discovery of unknown malware structures. 
Analysis of code-reuse by comparing malware families can 
also be done using clustering. Due to this nature of malware, 
many researchers use hierarchical clustering to exploit this 
information, as it can capture the level of similarities based 
on different levels of granularity shown as levels of groups in 
dendrograms. The dendrogram can also be used to determine 
the individual clusters of malware families. Another reason 
many researchers prefer hierarchical clustering is the fact that 
the number of clusters from the data set is not known and 
hierarchical clustering algorithm will determine it 
automatically. 
Despite that, hierarchical clustering is sensitive to noise and 
outliers. It is also unable to handle different sized clusters and 
convex shaped clusters. On the other hand, density-based 
algorithm such as DBSCAN does not suffer from noise and 
outliers as it is robust to it [27]. Another advantage of 
DBSCAN is that it can find clusters of arbitrary shape, as 
opposed to many other clustering algorithms. Like 
hierarchical clustering, DBSCAN does not require the 
number of clusters to be known a priori. However, DBSCAN 
is not able to cluster data of different density properly thus 
making it a limitation. 
By utilising the strength of these two types of algorithm, 
Hierarchical Density-Based Spatial Clustering of 
Applications with Noise (HDBSCAN) was developed [16].  
Its main capabilities are:  
1. the number of clusters are calculated automatically  
2. ability to handle clusters of different density and 
shapes 
3. ability to handle noise and outliers 
We propose that HDBSCAN to be used to solve the 
problem of having unbalanced and unknown malware 
dataset. It will be able to handle malware which cannot be 
added into any existing clusters by treating it as outliers. As 
such, it lowers the probability that a malware sample will be 
misclassified. HDBSCAN uses single-linkage clustering 
technique. To avoid the problem associated with this 
technique, it transforms the space by arranging the data space 
such as sparse points are pushed further away and the other 
points closer. This means that potential noise points are 
pushed further away in order to keep the results as accurate 
as possible. It does this by defining the core distance, 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑘(𝑥), where (𝑥) is the distance from its 𝑘-th nearest 
neighbour. It then calculates the mutual reachability distance 
which can be formalised as dmreach-k(a,b)=max (corek(a), 
corek(b), d(a,b)), where 𝑑(𝑎, 𝑏) is the metric distance 
between 𝑎 and 𝑏. From the transformed space, a distance 
matrix is formed, and a weighted graph can be used to 
represent the points. Then, the minimum spanning tree (MST) 
is constructed using Prim’s algorithm. 
The cluster hierarchy is then calculated from the minimum 
spanning tree. This is done by sorting the edges by distance 
from closest to furthest and iterate through. This creates a 
merged cluster for each edge. The result of this operation is a 
dendrogram. From this dendrogram, malware family 
relationship can be viewed. But for large dataset this can be 
infeasible. The clustering can stop here at this point, but it can 
still go further by turning the dendrogram into flat clusters 
automatically, as opposed to DBSCAN which requires the 
number of clusters to be specified. HDBSCAN first uses the 
minimum cluster size as a parameter to clean up the 
dendrogram by condensing it into a smaller tree. Once this is 
done, the clusters will be extracted by measuring the 
persistence and stability of the clusters. The persistence of the 
cluster can be formalised as λ =  1 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒⁄  where 𝜆𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ is 
defined as the distance at which a cluster’s parent split yield 
a cluster and 𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ is defined as the distance at which a 
cluster splits into sub-clusters. Then the stability of each 
cluster is calculated for each point within each cluster based 
on the value defined by 𝜆𝑝, which is the point at which cluster 
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splits. The value lies between 𝜆𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ and 𝜆𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ. It can be 
formalised as ∑ (𝜆𝑝 −  𝜆𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ)𝑝∈𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 . 
The leaf nodes are then declared as selected clusters. The 
algorithm works in reverse topological sort order to work 
through the tree to calculate the sum of stability. If the sum of 
the sub-cluster is greater than the cluster, then the stability of 
the cluster is set to the sub-cluster’s stabilities. On the other 
hand, if the sum of the cluster stability is more than the sum 
of the sub-cluster’s stability, then the cluster to be a selected 
cluster. The sub-cluster will then be part of the cluster. Once 
the operation reaches the root node, then the clusters are 
returned. Any points which are not selected are considered 





Figure 2: Pseudocode for HDBSCAN 
 
H. Report of Clustered Behaviour 
The results of the clustering will be saved in a file, e.g.: 
CSV format file, for storing the results. The results will 
contain the number of clusters generated, the properties of 
each clusters and the anomaly which are detected during the 
clustering. Anomalies in this case mean samples which 
cannot be clustered due to the number of similar samples 
being too low to be clustered. Visualisation techniques will 




Evaluating the quality of clustering results is an inherently 
difficult task.  Therefore, to evaluate the correctness of the 
clustering, a reference data set of known malware samples 
from Malheur is obtained [22]. We will compare the results 
from the Malheur reference data set using labels by major 
anti-malware companies and results from our framework. 
Although anti-malware labels suffer from inconsistencies 
in naming, selecting vendors which follows CARO naming 
convention for samples would produce consistent and 
accurate results. Once the framework has been evaluated and 
calibrated, the application data set can then be analysed. The 
results of the application data set will be discussed after the 
framework has been completed. 
To evaluate our framework based on the reference data set, 
we use the evaluation metrics of precision and recall. 
Precision reflects the agreement between malware classes and 
individual clusters, while recall reflects the extent of classes 
scattering across clusters. Precision for the set of cluster C 









where #c is the largest number of reports in cluster c sharing 
the same class. Recall for the set of malware classes M can 
be formally defined as; 
 







where #m is the largest number of reports labelled m within 
a cluster.  
The ideal case would be to have a 100% precision and 
100% recall value. However, in most cases, there will be a 
trade-off between precision and recall, as the threshold value 
needs to be set to determine the probability of the membership 
of malware classes. Thus, experiments will be conducted to 
find the best possible threshold value to get the best possible 
result based on precision and recall.  
A comparison of the analysis results of our framework 
against the framework created by [23] and [9] using the 
application data set will be done. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORKS 
 
The exponentially increasing malware threats in numbers and 
complexity means that there needs to be a way to efficiently 
analyse the large number of samples efficiently. This paper 
proposed a method to efficiently analyse malware in a 
scalable manner using clustering technique which is based on 
hierarchical structure and density. The methods used is 
designed to provide important analysis results such as 
common cluster behaviours, and this can assist in the creation 
of compact signatures and knowledge base. It can also be 
used for further manual analysis if required.  
Currently research is still being done on this framework. 
After completion, the framework will have additional 
capability to detect anomaly in the samples analysed and be 
capable of abnormal behaviour analysis. A comparison will 
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1. Transform the space according to the 
density/sparsity. 
a) Calculate core distance 
b) Spread points with differing density, 
calculate mutual reachability 
distance 
 
2. Build the minimum spanning tree of the 
distance weighted graph. 
a) Draw vertices for data points with 
weighted core points as edge 
 
3. Construct a cluster hierarchy of 
connected components. 
a) Convert minimum spanning tree into 
cluster hierarchy (dendrogram) 
 
4. Condense the cluster hierarchy based on 
minimum cluster size. 
a) Calculate minimum cluster size 
b) Determine cluster membership 
 
5. Extract the stable clusters from the 
condensed tree. 
a) Compute cluster stability 
b) Split clusters 
c) Data points which are not part of any 
clusters are considered noise 
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